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1 INTRODUCTION 
In the literature, studies of evidentials are quite variable. A number of researchers 
have investigated evidentials in various languages: Quechua (Faller (2002)), 
Cheyenne (Murray (2010)), St’át’imcets (Matthewson et al. (2007)) German (Faller 
(2006, 2012), Japanese (McCready and Ogata (2007)), just to name a few. Each 
language has its own evidential system distinct from other languages; for example, 
while Cuzco Quechua has direct, reportative, and inferential evidentials, Japanese has 
inferential and reportative evidentials but not direct ones, and while Japanese and 
Quechua evidentials are enclitics, the German reportative evidential sollen is 
obviously an auxiliary. Accordingly, how to analyze evidentials depends on what 
language is being dealt with. Faller (2002) argues that Quechua evidentials are 
illocutionary operators that modify the speech act of utterances, while Matthewson et 
al. (2007) analyze St’át’imcets evidentials as epistemic modals. Thus it seems quite 
difficult to give a unified account of evidentials in general. 
McCready (2015), I believe, implies the possibility of a unified accounts. He 
proposes an interesting and remarkable approach to evidential systems in terms of 
dynamic semantics. His analysis captures the very nature of evidentials and 
information acquisition, from the position of dynamic semantics. In this paper, I 
introduce some remarkable points of McCready’s system, and propose some revision 
of it, particularly about the system of update. In his system, information update does 
not eliminate possible worlds contained in an information state, but alters the ordering 
of plausibility between worlds. This type of update is quite different from existing 
dynamic semantic theories, and has some empirical problems. Thus, the aim of this 
paper is to integrate ordinary eliminative update into McCready’s system, in order for 
the system to capture empirical facts that standard dynamic analyses have accounted 
for. 
This paper is constructed as follows. Section 2 discusses very briefly the notion of 
evidential and shows what kinds of evidentials there are in Japanese, which is the 
language McCready (2015) and this paper mainly deal with. In section 3, I introduce 
relevant parts of McCready’s system. In section 4, I present my proposal, introducing 
a new notion of information state, and compare my framework with McCready’s 
system, in terms of whether they can account for facts about presupposition, pronoun 
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resolution, and logical inference. Section 5 is the conclusion. 
2 JAPANESE EVIDENTIALS 
Generally speaking, evidentials are linguistic expressions that primarily indicate what 
type of evidence the speaker bases her utterance on (de Haan (1999) and Aikhenvald 
(2004)). For example, Cuzco Quechua has three evidential enclitics: -mi (direct), -si 
(reportative), and -chá (inferential). The example sentences from Faller (2002) are 
presented below. 
(1) a.  Para-sha-n-mi 
   rain-Prog-3-mi 
   Proposition = ‘It is raining.’ 
   Evidence: speaker sees that it is raining. 
 b.  Para-sha-n-si 
   rain-Prog-3-si 
   Proposition = ‘It is raining.’ 
   Evidence: speaker was told that it is raining. 
 c.  Para-sha-n-chá 
   rain-Prog-3-chá 
   Proposition = ‘It is raining.’ 
   Evidence: speaker conjectures that it is raining. (Faller 2002: 3) 
In (1a), it is indicated that the speaker utters the proposition, based on what she has 
seen. In (1b), the evidence comes from someone’s report, and in (1c), the speaker 
indicates that the proposition is based on the speaker’s inference from some indirect 
evidence. 
Japanese also has a number of evidential expressions, representatives of which are 
the reportative or hearsay evidential -soo, the inferential evidentials -mitai, -yoo, 
-rashii, and inf-soo (suffixed to infinitives). Here are some examples: 
(2) a.  hearsay -soo 
   John-wa mainichi  sampo-suru  soo da. 
   John-Top  every day take a walk soo Cop.Pres 
   “I heard that John takes a walk every day.” 
 b.  inferential -mitai, -yoo, -rashii 
   John-wa  mainichi  sampo-suru  mitai/ yoo da. 
   John-Top every day take a walk mitai/ yoo Cop.Pres 
   “I infer from pieces of evidence that John takes a walk every day.” 
Japanese evidentials, like evidentials in other languages, show a syntactically and 
semantically interesting behavior: they cannot be embedded under certain operators 
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(e.g., negation, conditional, modal, and question). Although I do not deal with this 
phenomenon, more detailed discussion about the scope relation between negation and 
evidentials is found in McCready and Ogata (2007) and Kalsang et al. (2013). 
3 SUBSTATES IN INFORMATION STATE 
In this section, I briefly introduce the system McCready (2015) proposes and its 
difference from ordinary dynamic semantics. He argues that the form and target of 
updates with evidentially marked sentences are different from what has been assumed 
to be information update. Let us look closely at some parts of his mechanism which 
are relevant to our discussion. 
3.1 The standard update      
Before the review of McCready (2015), let us see what the ordinary information 
update is like. In dynamic semantics1, particularly in update semantics (Groenendijk 
et al. (1996)), it is assumed that there is an information state σ, which corresponds to 
what somebody knows and is a set of possible worlds. As each sentence ϕ is uttered, it 
updates the hearer’s information state, resulting in the new information state σ' which 
is represented as σ[ϕ] = σ'. σ' represents what the hearer knows after understanding ϕ. 
If ϕ is a declarative sentence, the effect of update with ϕ is illustrated as follows: 
(3) σ[ϕ] = σ' = σ ∩{w: ‖ϕ‖(w) = 1} = {w  σ | w  ϕ} 
The new information state σ' is the intersection of two sets σ and the proposition ϕ. 
Thus standard updates are eliminative in the sense that worlds where ϕ does not hold 
(henceforth, ϕ-worlds) are excluded from the resulting state σ'. In this way, 
information states narrow down as discourse proceeds. 
3.2 New forms of update 
McCready (2015) revises this system, in order to capture facts about evidentials2. The 
simplest example which is problematic for the eliminative update is3: 
                                                          
1 I wrote this introduction of ordinary dynamic semantics with reference to Portner (2009: 85-93). 
2 Note that here I introduce from McCready (2015) only a part relevant to our discussion. His entire 
system is much more sophisticated than what is written here.  
3 McCready himself does not point out that (4) is problematic for the standard dynamic semantics, but 
I think that this example is a typical case that his system can account for while the standard dynamic 
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(4) a.   Ame-ga furu mitai 
   rain-Nom fall mitai 
   ‘It seems as if it’ll rain.’ 
 b.  Demo Taro niyoruto  fur-anai soo da 
   but Taro according-to rain-Neg soo Cop.Pres 
   ‘But according Taro it won’t rain.’ 
    (McCready 2015: 212) 
Suppose that this sentence is uttered by one speaker and in one breath. This natural 
example will be ruled out by the standard dynamic semantics, because under the 
assumption that evidentials make no contribution to the semantics of sentences they 
are attached to, the form of updates in (4) will be (σ[rain])[rain], resulting in as state 
which is empty, and thus predicting that (4) should be unacceptable. 
McCready (2015)’s proposal is that updates caused by evidentially marked 
sentences are not eliminative. In his system, as a result of updating of a state of an 
agent with an evidentially marked sentence, a world is privileged over another if it is 
considered more plausible by the agent. The formal definition of the model containing 
such an ordering and abbreviations used in what follows are given below: 
(5) Plausibility frame 
   A plausibility frame is a multi-agent Kripke frame <S, Ra>aA where 
the accessibility relation Ra are called “plausibility orders” written a, 
and assumed to be locally connected preorders. 
   (S is a set of worlds, R a binary relation on S, and A a set of agents) 
(6) Plausibility models 
   A plausibility model is a structure S = < S, a, [[. ]], s0 >, i.e. a 
plausibility frame together with a valuation function [[. ]]: At ↦ (S) 
and a designated world s0, the “actual world.” (S is a set of worlds.) 
(7) a.   s a t iff world t is considered more plausible by agent a than world s. 
 b.  s ~a t if s and t are comparable for agent a, that is, epistemically 
indistinguishable in terms of hard information. 
 c.  s(a) = {t  S | t ~a s} (a’s epistemic alternatives at s) 
    (McCready 2015: 188) 
With this notion of plausibility orders, McCready defines another type of update, 
represented as [.]: 
(8)   σ[ϕ] = σ', where S' = S and s 'a t iff either (i) s  ϕ and t  s(a) ∩ ϕ, or 
(ii) s a t. (McCready 2015: 190) 
This definition roughly means that as a result of update with [.], the set of worlds that 
forms σ is left untouched, and world t is privileged over s if and only if either s is not 
                                                                                                                                          
semantics cannot. 
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a ϕ-world and t is one of the a’s epistemic alternatives at s and a ϕ-world, or before 
the update, t is privileged over s. McCready also defines the “standard” update in 
terms of this system, written as [.]!: 
(9) σ[ϕ]! = σ', where S' = {s  S | s ⊨ ϕ} and s 'a t iff s a t & s, t  S'
 (McCready 2015:190) 
This roughly means that as a result of update with [.]!, ϕ-worlds are excluded from σ 
and if s and t are both left in the resulting set of worlds, their plausible ordering is left 
untouched. This update equals the standard update plus the notion of plausibility 
ordering. 
To understand how these updates work, let us see McCready’s example. Consider 
the following single-agent model, with agent a, as shown in (10). Here the arrows 
represent plausibility preferences, p and q represent propositions true at a world. So 
{p, q} is a world s where p and q are both true. 
(10)   {p, q} → {p, q} ↔ {p, q} → {p, q} 
In this model, a has not excluded either p or q, but finds them less plausible than their 
negations. Let us call this information state σ. When you update σ with [p]! (i.e., σ[p]!), 
the state of the form {p, q} → {p, q} will result. That is, p-worlds are excluded 
and the initial plausibility order between worlds remains intact. 
What about the case of σ[p]? This gives rise to the following state: 
(11)   {p, q} → {p, q} → {p, q} → {p, q} 
In new state σ' resulting from the update, p-worlds are preferred to p-worlds, while 
the initial ordering between q-worlds and q-worlds are maintained4. That is the 
illustration from McCready (2015: 191). 
                                                          
4 Here, I wonder whether (11) is really derived from (8). Suppose that {p, q} and {p, q} in (10), the 
state before update, are t and s in (8), respectively. Then with the update with p, (8) will correctly derive 
the resulting ordering {p, q} → {p, q}, that is, s a t. In this case, the condition (i) is applied, since 
the initial ordering is {p, q} → {p, q}, that is, t a s, so (ii) cannot be applied. Next, suppose that {p, q} 
is s and {p, q} is t. Then in the course of update, only the condition (ii) can be applied, since, while the 
initial ordering is s a t, s (i.e. {p, q}) is a member of p, so (i) cannot be applied. In this case, (8) will 
derive s a t, that is, {p, q} → {p, q}, the same as the initial state. Thus, depending on which world in a 
state is chosen as s and which world is chosen as t, the result of (8) will vary, an undesirable situation. It 
is possible that I have overlooked some assumption that McCready makes in other areas of his book. But 
it is the case that definition (8) alone cannot predict desirable results. In what follows, this problem is not 
relevant to our discussion. The revision of (8) is left for future research. What is important is that σ[ϕ] 
does not eliminate ϕ-worlds but ranks ϕ-worlds higher than ϕ-worlds. 
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3.3 Substates contained in a state and merge operation 
In order to associate information update with evidentials, McCready (2015) also 
revises the notion of information states. What he wants to capture is that, given two 
evidentials, Evid1 and Evid2 such that the evidence source marked by Evid2 is more 
reliable than that marked by Evid1, we want σ[Evid1ϕ  Evid2ϕ] to correspond to 
σ[ϕ] but not σ[ϕ]. For example, direct evidence is generally more reliable than 
inferential evidence, so when an agent observes Infϕ  Directϕ, the update of the 
form σ[Infϕ  Directϕ] will correspond to σ[ϕ]. To derive this result, he proposes 
that Evid1ϕ and Evid2ϕ update distinct information states which are contained in the 
global information state. 
(12) a.   Global information state σ comprises sets of information states 
indexed by different evidence types. 
 b.  Update with content marked as coming from evidence source ei will 
induce an update in the corresponding σi  σ. 
 c.  That is, σ = {σi | i  Source}, 
   where Source = {direct, sensory, hearsay…} 
(13)  σ[Eiϕ] = σ' where, for all σj  σ, σ'j = σj[ϕ] if i = j 
  σ'j = σj if i ≠ j 
(E is an existential quantifier over an evidence source, so Eiϕ 
represents a proposition with indication of the existence of evidence 
source i.)   (McCready 2015: 195) 
For example, sentences with direct evidentials do not update σ, that is, the global 
information state, but σdirect which is a member of σ, and no other substates in σ are 
left untouched. McCready claims that the type of update that is exploited here is [.]. 
Thus, after update, only the plausibility ordering between worlds in σdirect is altered, 
and worlds in the substates remain intact. 
This revision of information states alone is not sufficient for explanation of the 
fact that σ[Evid1ϕ  Evid2ϕ] corresponds to σ[ϕ]. What is needed then is to 
transmit the result of the update of substates to the global information state. This is 
done by merging substates contained in σ. Such a merge operation occurs locally: 
each two substates are merged recursively, and finally one state is left as a result of 
the merging operation. Here is the formal definition. 
(14) Lexicographic merge 
 
   (Ra represents a’s plausibility ordering over worlds.) 
If there are two substates a and b, and the source associated with a is more reliable 
than that associated with b, represented as a > b, then this operation gives rise to a 
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new ordering where the ordering in a is retained and privileged over the ordering in b, 
and among the worlds ranked equally in a, b’s ordering is reflected. 
Let us see how this operation works. Suppose that there are two substates a and b 
which are ordered a > b, and that each of them has the following plausibility ordering 
over worlds. 
(15) a.   Initial plausibility orderings 
{p, q} ↔a {p, q} ←a {p, q}   {p, q} →b {p, q} →b {p, q} 
(→a represents the plausibility ordering in state a, and ↔a means that 
two worlds connected by this symbol are indifferent in a, i.e., that 
there is no preference between them) 
 b.  The result of merge operation 
   {p, q} → {p, q} ← {p, q} 
In the initial situation in (15a), a ranks {p, q} over {p, q}, while b does the 
opposite. When such a conflict occurs, the reliability relation of sources is considered, 
and the plausibility ordering of the substate with the more reliable source is retained. 
In this case, since a > b, a’s ordering is maintained. On the other hand, a does not 
posit any ranking between {p, q} and {p, q}. In such a case b’s ordering is reflected 
on the result ordering. This merge operation is performed among substates recursively, 
and finally one information state is generated. McCready calls this state the total 
information state. 
In the process of this merge operation, the plausibility ordering that survives is the 
ordering in a substate that is associated with reliable source. Therefore, in the case of 
σ[Infϕ  Directϕ], the ordering in σdirect that takes ϕ-worlds to be more plausible 
than ϕ-worlds will override the ordering in σInf that ranks ϕ-worlds higher than 
ϕ-worlds, because direct evidence source is considered more reliable than inferential 
evidence sources. Thus σ[ϕ] is derived, with ϕ-worlds a ϕ-worlds. 
3.4 Interim summary 
What has been introduced in this section as for McCready (2015) is repeated as 
follows: 
(16) a.   Information state σ is taken to be the global state, a set of substates 
indexed with different evidence sources. 
 b.  Update caused by an evidentially marked sentence alters the 
plausibility ordering in substates, but it does not eliminate any world. 
 c.  Merging substates gives rise to the total information state with a new 
plausibility ordering. 
What is interesting in McCready’s approach is that with this type of mechanism, 
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we might be able to reach a unified analysis of evidentials in general. As suggested in 
the beginning of this paper, a unified approach to evidentials in different languages is 
difficult mainly for two reasons: i) different languages have different evidential 
systems, and ii) evidentials differ across languages in terms of their grammatical 
category. The first problem is not so crucial. In McCready’s system, the difference in 
evidential system is reduced to the difference in which evidential is associated with 
which substates. We can assume that even evidential-free sentences can update some 
substate (this possibility is suggested by McCready himself; we will return to it in the 
next section)5, 6. The second problem, on the other hand, is hard to deal with. Treating 
expressions in different grammatical categories in the same way is very difficult for a 
syntactic or compositional semantic approach. In McCready’s system, however, even 
though the grammatical categories of evidentials are not the same universally, it does 
not matter, since their contribution is the same regardless of what category they 
belong to: they only designate what substate is updated. Of course, the syntactic 
approach and compositional approach are both necessary and important, but, at 
present, treating evidentials in those frameworks is very difficult. 
Having reviewed the proposal of McCready (2015), we are ready to turn to our 
main concern: Whether his treatment of update, which does not allow elimination, is 
truly adequate? 
4 HOW TO UPDATE INFORMATION STATES AND SUBSTATES 
So far we have seen what McCready’s (2015) mechanism is like. In this section, I 
propose some modification to it. Concretely, I propose that update by evidential-free 
information does not target a substate, but the global state, and accordingly, the global 
state is not a set of substates, but a set of possible worlds, and substates are subsets of 
the global state. By this modification, we will be able to treat phenomena which have 
been dealt with within the framework of ordinary dynamic semantics. 
                                                          
5 Approaches like that of Faller (2002), in which evidentials alter the speech acts of sentences, can 
capture the difference by assuming each evidential in each language alters speech acts in its own way. 
However, a problem arises. In Faller’s analysis, Cuzco Quechua evidentials alter the speech act Assert. 
This analysis is possible because they are not embeddable in other speech acts, e.g., Question. Some 
Japanese evidentials, in particular, (inf)-soo, are embeddable in questions. This means that when Faller’s 
analysis is applied to the Japanese (inf)-soo, the input of (inf)-soo will not be constant, which seems to 
inflict the unity of the analysis, in which all evidentials alter Assert. In addition, if we extend Faller’s 
approach to languages other than Cuzco Quechua, we have to write, for each evidential in each language, 
how it alters speech acts, while McCready’s approach treats evidentials in different languages quite 
simply; for example, if an evidential is inferential, it updates σinf. Of course, Faller’s analysis has an 
obvious advantage in that it captures the idiosyncrasy of each evidential. In other words, application of 
McCready’s proposal to every evidential is better in terms of unity, but it might be too strong and we 
might overlook the characteristics each evidential possesses. 
6 Speas (2010) points out that the maximal number of evidence types evidentials can encode is fixed 
universally. This supports McCready’s analysis in that with this number limitation, we do not have to 
assume an infinite number of substates. 
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4.1 Substates as subsets 
My main points are (i) that evidential-free information updates the global state in the 
way of [.]! and (ii) that substates are not members of the global state, but subsets of it. 
As for (i), in McCready’s system, it is assumed that all sentences including 
evidential-free sentences have their own evidence source and their form of update is 
to alter plausibility orderings in a certain substate. It follows that in his system, 
information acquisition does not eliminate any world; it only orders worlds in 
substates. Even after the merge operation, no world is eliminated. This is crucial, 
since dynamic semantics so far have explained a variety of phenomena with the 
mechanism of elimination, e.g. presupposition. I will assume that elimination 
mechanism is preserved in the substates-system. Thus, in order for evidential-free 
information to update the global state, it has to be a set of worlds, hence (ii). Thus I 
propose the following formal definition. 
(17) a.   σ[ϕ] = σ[ϕ]! if ϕ is of the form ψ 
 σ[ϕ] if ϕ is of the form Eiψ 
 b.  σi  σ for i  Source 
If an agent acquires ϕ, then her global information state is updated in an eliminative 
manner. All ϕ-worlds including worlds contained in substates are eliminated from 
her state, represented in Figure 1 (in the next page, wϕ represents a ϕ-world). As is 
seen from Figure 1, there are worlds which do not belong to any substates. These 
worlds are not associated with any evidence source7. Instead, they can be thought of 
as worlds associated with what the agent already knows. One may argue that this 
update is too strong in that it eliminates ϕ-worlds not only the ones that do not 
belong to any substate, but also those that are contained in substates (in Figure 1, σi 
and σj). This predicts that after this update, one cannot utter ϕ with any evidential, 
which is borne out: 
(18)   (Uttered by the speaker who knows that it is raining) 
  # Ame-ga  futteinai yoo-da/soo-da/rashii. 
   rain-Nom fall-Prog-Neg yoo-Cop.Pres/soo-Cop.Pres/rashii 
   ‘I infer/heard that it is not raining.’ 
The global state of the utterer of (18) is updated by the proposition ‘it is raining 
(rain)’ since she knows that it is raining, so there is no rain-world in her σInf and σRep. 
Therefore update by EvidInf rain and EvidReprain is infelicitous. (18) cannot be 
explained in McCready’s system, where evidential-free sentences update some 
substate and leave other substates untouched. 
One may question about how is the plausibility order of the worlds which are not 
                                                          
7 One can say that these worlds are associated with best possible grounds in the sense of Faller (2002). 
I leave this possibility for future research. 
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contained in any substate and what merge operation in this revised system is like. As 
for the former, we need not order such worlds, because, as is the case with the 
standard information state, they constitute what one knows, and therefore they are 
equally maximally plausible. As for the second question, we need some kind of merge 
operation, since without it, update by evidentially marked sentences does not affect 
the global information, which is unintuitive. I assume that, also in the revised system, 
the lexicographic merge in (14) is operative. But the difference from McCready’s 
system is that, in the revised system, the information state generated by merging all 
substates (let us call it σM) is merged with the global information state (σG) containing 
worlds that do not belong to any substates. Given that all of the worlds in σG is 
equally maximally plausible, the result of such merger will be the one in which 
worlds in σM are ranked lower than worlds in σG. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In the following subsections, I compare McCready’s system with the revised 
version, in the light of whether they can capture phenomena that standard dynamic 
theories have accounted for. 
4.2 Presupposition and pronoun resolution 
In this section, I consider presupposition and a particular case of pronoun resolution. 
The standard dynamic theories are useful to treat these phenomena, so variants of 
dynamic theories have to be able to capture them. 
4.2.1 Presupposition     In order to discuss presupposition, let us see how 
presupposition is treated in standard dynamic theories. A sentence S that presupposes 
ϕ is defined only in worlds where ϕ holds. In terms of dynamic semantics, it means 
that S updates the information state in such a way that the intersection is made 
σ 
σi σj 
wϕ wϕ 
wϕ wϕ 
wϕ 
wϕ wϕ 
wϕ 
σ' 
σi σj 
wϕ wϕ 
wϕ wϕ 
 
  
 
Figure 1: The result of update by evidential-free sentence 
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between the proposition denoted by S and the worlds in the information state where ϕ 
holds. Put in another way, if ϕ holds in at least one world in the information state, the 
update by S is successful. 
With this idea in mind, consider the following case.  
(19)    Taro-wa tabako-o   sut-tei-na-katta  
   Taro-Top tobacco-Acc  smoke-Prog-Neg-Past 
  # ga suu-no-o  yame-ta yoo/soo-da. 
   but smoke-that-Acc stop-Past yoo/soo-Cop.Pres. 
   ‘Taro had been smoking, but I infer/heard that he stopped smoking.’ 
If evidential-free proposition updates only some substate, (19) would be acceptable, 
because worlds necessary for the second conjunct to be defined, i.e. worlds where 
Taro had been smoking, are not excluded from σInf or σRep, and therefore evidentially 
marked sentences would successfully update their relevant substates, contrary to the 
fact. The absence of the mechanism of elimination causes this problem. In the revised 
version, however, all the worlds where Taro had been smoking are eliminated from 
the global state and every substate by the first sentence, so sentences with evidentials 
are not defined, hence unacceptability. 
It might be possible that McCready assumes in his system that after lexicographic 
merge operation, worlds ranked lower are eliminated from every substate. If so, (19) 
will be explicable. What is needed then is, however, to define how highly worlds have 
to be ranked in order not to be eliminated. This question is very hard to answer. 
4.2.2 Pronoun resolution     Consider the following example. 
(20)    Ookami-ga ki-ta. 
   wolf-Nom come-Past 
   Yatsu-wa hara-ga-hetteiru yoo/soo-da. 
   it-Top hangry  yoo/soo-Cop.Pres 
   ‘A wolf came. I infer/heard that it is hungry.’ 
In order to treat this example, we should define how to treat pronouns. I adopt the 
idea of Groenendijk et al. (1996). They treat elements of information states are 
world-assignment pairs. Their idea is that when xϕ updates an information state, all 
ϕ-worlds and assignments paired with them are eliminated, and assignments paired 
with ϕ-worlds, which are left in the updated state, are extended so that they can assign 
the existentially introduced object to the new variable x. In (20), the object is the wolf, 
that is, the information “x → a wolf” is added to assignments of worlds where a wolf 
came. 
In the revised version, as a result of the update by the first sentence, assignments 
of all the worlds where a wolf came, some of which are contained in σInf and σRep are 
extended, and since the second update targets such updated worlds and assignments 
contained in the relevant substate, the pronoun resolution will be successful. On the 
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other hand, in McCready’s system the update by the first sentence targets only its 
relevant substate, and therefore it does not extend assignments paired with worlds 
contained in σInf and σRep. Then, the pronoun resolution should be unsuccessful, 
though it is actually not. 
One might claim that an information state consists of not world-time pairs, but 
worlds, and one assignment is shared by all the worlds in the state, and that no matter 
what substate an existentially quantified proposition updates, it extends the shared 
assignments. For example, when update is caused by existentially quantifying 
proposition associated with reportative evidence, the existential quantification extends 
the shared assignment, and the worlds not only in σRep but also in other substates 
exploit the extended assignment. In that case, (20) will be explained, since all 
substates including σInf and σRep can access to the extended assignment. Then, however, 
the following case is problematic8. 
(21)   Ookami-ga ki-ta  yoo/soo-da. 
wolf-Nom come-Past  yoo/soo-Cop.Pres 
  #Yatsu-wa hara-ga-hetteiru 
   it-Top hangry 
   ‘I infer/heard that a wolf came. It is hungry.’ 
If an assignment is shared by all substates, then the second sentence in (21) should be 
able to access to it, but (21) shows that it cannot. It follows that worlds do not share 
one assignment. 
4.3 Logical inference     The final case I deal with is logical inferences. Although 
this term can be interpreted in various ways, I will call inferences like ones presented 
below logical inference. 
(22)    Mary returned a book to the library yesterday. 
   The only book Mary had borrowed was LGB.   
   Mary returned LGB to the library yesterday. 
The sentence under the line is the conclusion deduced from the above two sentences. 
In order to treat this type of inference in terms of dynamic semantics, let us make a 
natural assumption that in order for (22) to hold, it is necessary that the worlds in 
which Mary returned a book to the library (represented Ret(m, b)) holds have to be 
ones where The only book Mary had borrowed was LGB (Borr(m, L)) holds. This 
assumption is natural because, if you believe that Mary borrowed not only LGB but 
Barriers, or that it is possible that the second premise does not hold, this inference is 
not valid. 
                                                          
8 This example is like modal subordination. For the detail discussion of it, See van Rooji (2005) and 
Asher and McCready (2007). 
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Let us turn to the case with evidentials. Consider the following. 
(23)    (Yesterday, you heard from Taro, “Today, Hanako retuned a book she 
had borrowed to the library.” You are now talking with Jiro, your 
colleague and both you and Jiro know that Hanako borrowed only 
LGB, but Jiro does not know Hanako returned a book. You say) 
   Hanako-ga kinou kenkyuushitsu-ni LGB-o 
   Hanako-Nom yesterday library-to  LGB-Acc 
   kaeshiniki-ta  soo-da. 
   come to return-Past soo-Cop.Pres. 
   ‘I heard that Hanako returned LGB to the laboratory yesterday.’ 
The acceptability of this example indicates that the following inference is valid. 
(24)  Rep (Mary returned a book to the laboratory). 
  The only book Mary had borrowed was LGB.   
  Rep(Mary returned LGB to the laboratory.) 
  (where Rep (ϕ) represents ϕ has reportative evidence) 
With the assumption made above, (24) means that at least in σRep, Ret(h, b) holds in all 
the world where Borr(h, L) holds. This indicates that all the Borr(h, L)-worlds are 
eliminated from σRep.  
In the case of inferential evidentials, the same happens. 
(25)   (When you entered the laboratory, you find a note left behind. The 
note said, “I retuned a book.” but no name was written on the note. 
The book seemed to have been put in bookshelves, so you did not 
find what book had been returned. You smelled the perfume that 
Mary always wears. You and Jiro know that Mary borrowed only 
LGB. After that, when you see Jiro, You say) 
   Hanako-ga kenkyuushitsu-ni LGB-o 
   Hanako-Nom laboratory-to LGB-Acc 
   kaeshiniki-ta  yoo-da. 
   come to return-Past yoo-Cop.Pres. 
   ‘I heard that Hanako returned LGB to the laboratory yesterday.’ 
In this case, too, the same inference pattern as (24) occurs and it is thought that all the 
Bor(h, L)-worlds are eliminated from σInf. The revised version, which allows update 
of the global information state, captures these facts about logical inference. 
On the other hand, McCready’s system cannot explain why such inferences are 
valid, since in his system the proposition Borr(h, L) does not update σRep and σInf. The 
assumption that all the Ret(h, b) worlds have to be ones where Bor(h, L) holds will 
not be satisfied. This is also due to the lack of elimination mechanism. 
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4.4 Rethinking information states in general 
As has been discussed so far, the main problem of McCready (2015) is that his system 
does not assume eliminative update. But as is pointed out in section 4.2.1, McCready 
might assume some elimination strategy. It is possible that after the merge operation, 
worlds which are ranked low to some extent will be eliminated. But this type of 
mechanism is very difficult to construct, since it is hard to determine how plausible an 
information has to be in order to say that one “knows” the information. I think that 
this is an extra-linguistic matter. 
It should be noted that the revised system also has a crucial problem. What is the 
most striking different between McCready’s system and the revised version is that the 
latter allows worlds that do not belong to any substates indexed by evidence-types. 
This means that such worlds are not associated with any evidence source, and the 
propositions that update them, (i.e., ϕ without any evidence) is acquired through no 
evidence source. Is it possible? Probably, no. As McCready points out, “Presumably 
all newly acquired information comes from some observation or other (2015: 196)”. 
In order to perform such a non-evidence source update, we have to establish some 
mechanism which convert σ[Eiϕ] into σ[ϕ], but this attempt is hopeless. For example, 
when an agent observe Eiϕ, what kind of conditions should be met in order for the 
update by it to be σ[ϕ], but not σ[Eiϕ]? One might claim that if the source indexed 
with i is sufficiently reliable, Eiϕ is converted into ϕ. Then, however, how reliable 
should the source be in order to allow such a conversion. Here, we confront the same 
problem described in the last paragraph. 
To see what is problematic, take the case of (19). Suppose that the speaker of (19) 
is John and the hearer is Mary. When Mary hears the first sentence of (19), what is 
updated is not σ, but σRep, since that sentence comes with the reportative source, John. 
Then the result of update by (19) will be different from what is desired. Thus, the 
problem is that when one observes or hears ϕ, it necessarily comes with some 
evidence source. As long as we assume that observing or hearing ϕ leads to updating 
only observer’s (hearer’s) information state, this problem will never be solved. 
To avoid this problem, we have to change the model of information states and 
discourse updates. My rough and crude idea is as follows. In conversation, the hearer 
is considering what the speaker’s information state is like, and creating in her mind 
the speaker’s information state by hearing the speaker’s utterances. If the speaker’s 
state in the hearer’s mind is made sufficiently sophisticated, then the hearer knows 
what the speaker knows and thinks. In that case the information transmission from the 
speaker to the hearer succeeded. And while the hearer is constructing the speaker’s 
state, her state is simultaneously being updated, in the way described in the last 
paragraph. 
Take again (19) for an example. Suppose that the speaker and hearer are John and 
Mary, respectively. Given the utterances in (19), Mary imagines in her mind what 
John’s information state is like. The first sentence is evidential-free, which means that 
John knows that the proposition is true. Then the update caused by the first sentence 
is of the form σ[ϕ], an eliminative update. The second sentence is decorated with 
some evidential, and the update by it targets σInf / Rep. As a result, what Mary considers 
to be John’s information state is infelicitous one; in all worlds contained in σInf / Rep, 
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presupposition of the second sentence does not hold. Therefore, John’s information 
state is considered to be impossible by Mary, hence unacceptability. While updating 
John’s information state in her mind, Mary also updates her information state. In this 
case, the update by the first and second sentence targets σRep, since the information in 
(19) comes with the reportative evidence, John. 
Put shortly, I suggest that when one hears utterances by someone, she updates not 
only her state, but also what she considers to be the speaker’s state. And when the 
tentative speaker’s state is not felicitous, the uttered sentences will be unacceptable. 
(19) and other examples in this paper will be explained in this way. 
5 CONCLUSION 
In this paper, I introduced McCready’s (2015) treatment of evidentials. The idea of it 
is remarkable, and his mechanism contains the possibility of dealing with evidentials 
in general in a unified way. His main proposal is to divide an information state to 
several substates, and associate each of these substates with some evidence source. 
After the introduction, I proposed revision on his system. My main point is that there 
are worlds which do not belong to any substate, and that evidential-free information 
updates the global state in an eliminative manner. It was shown that this revision has 
empirical advantage over McCready’s original system. Finally I propose a new form 
of processing the speaker’s information state, which is necessary to integrate 
eliminative update into McCready’s framework. 
If my proposal here is on the right track, we can allow the standard dynamic 
theories, which exploit elimination mechanism and McCready’s remarkable work, 
which captures the nature of our information acquisition, to coexist. 
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